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688 
Primer 
 
By Samantha Conway, David Diab, Amanda Fiorilla, & 
Eric Grossfeld 
 
I. The Inception of Public Corruption: Pre-McDonnell 
 
 A. The Mail Fraud Statute 
 
When first enacted in 1872, the mail fraud statute 
prohibited the use of the mail in furtherance of “any scheme or 
artifice to defraud.”1  The Supreme Court held in Durland v. 
United States that the mail fraud statute must be read to include 
“everything designed to defraud by representations as to the 
past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.”2 
The Court rejected the argument raised by defense counsel, 
claiming that the statute required some “misrepresentation as 
to some existing fact,” rather than a “mere promise as to the 
future.”3  The Court clarified that the statute was to be read 
broadly in light of its ultimate purpose: 
 
It was with the purpose of protecting the public 
against all such intentional efforts to despoil, and 
to prevent the post office from being used to carry 
them into effect, that this statute was passed; and 
it would strip it of value to confine it to such cases 
as disclose an actual misrepresentation as to some 
existing fact, and exclude those in which is only 
the allurement of a promise.4 
 
 
 
1.   Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (1872) amended by Act 
of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (1889). 
2.  161 U.S. 306, 312-14 (1896).  In Durland, the Defendant had used the 
mails to sell bonds to members of the public which he had no intention of 
honoring.  Id. 
3.  Id. at 312. 
4.  Id. at 314. 
1
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Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1909 in a 
manner consistent with the Durland holding.  The statute read 
“any scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises.”5 
 
 B. The Intangible Rights Theory 
 
This language was construed by each of the circuit courts of 
appeal to include “schemes to defraud include[ing] those 
designed to deprive individuals, the people, or the government 
of intangible rights, such as the right to have public officials 
perform their duties honestly.”6  Therefore, depriving members 
of the public of the right to honest services could form the basis 
of a violation of the mail fraud statute, regardless of whether 
there was a loss or deprivation of some tangible right.7 
This right to honest services or intangible-rights theory, is 
often credited to an opinion by the Fifth Circuit in Shushan v. 
United States.  In Shushan, a public official was charged and 
convicted under the mail fraud statute for accepting a bribe in 
exchange for a public contract, even though the contract was 
mutually beneficial and involved no loss of any tangible property 
on behalf of the city or general public.8 As an example of this 
theory: 
 
[I]f a city mayor (the offender) accepted a bribe 
from a third party in exchange for awarding that 
party a city contract, yet the contract terms were 
the same as any that could have been negotiated 
at arm’s length, the city (the betrayed party) 
would suffer no tangible loss. . . . Even if the 
scheme occasioned a money or property gain for 
 
5.  Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (1889) amended by 
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909) (emphasis added). 
6.  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356-58 (1987). 
7.  See, e.g., United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975) 
(mutually beneficial kick-back agreement with Secretary of State within the 
scope of § 1341); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973) (use of 
the mails to fraudulently write-in voter ballots within the scope of § 1341).  
8.  117 F.2d 110, 115-19 (5th Cir. 1941). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/2
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the betrayed party, courts reasoned, actionable 
harm lay in the denial of that party’s right to the 
offender’s “honest services.”9 
 
In McNally v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected 
such a broad interpretation, and construed the statute “as 
limited in scope to the protection of property rights.”10  The Court 
reasoned that such a result was necessary, as any alternative 
would involve “constru[ing] the statute in a manner that leaves 
its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal 
Government in setting standards of disclosure and good 
government for local and state officials.”11 
The decision “stopped the development of the intangible-
rights doctrine in its tracks,” despite a vigorous dissent by 
Justice Stevens.12  The court explained, “[i]f Congress desires to 
go further, it must speak more clearly than it has.”13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 363 (2010) (internal citations 
omitted). “Unlike fraud in which the victim’s loss of money or property supplied 
the defendant’s gain, with one the mirror image of the other . . .the honest-
services theory targeted corruption that lacked similar symmetry.” Id. at 400 
(internal citations omitted). 
10.  483 U.S. at 360.  In McNally, the prosecutor argued a state official’s 
kickback scheme “defraud[ed] the citizens and government of Kentucky of their 
right to have the Commonwealth’s affairs conducted honestly.”  Id. at 353.  The 
Supreme Court held the jury instruction permitted a conviction under the mail 
fraud statute for conduct not within the reach of § 1341, and therefore reversed 
the conviction. Id. 
11.  Id. at 353. 
12.  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 400 (2010); McNally v. United 
States, 483 U.S. at 362 (J., Stevens, dissenting).  Justice Stevens cited to 
several cases, including United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 
1975), in which the Illinois Secretary of State accepted around $50,000 a year 
to award contracts to a particular company.  Although all the parties to the 
agreement profited from the transaction, the Court of Appeals explained the 
real victims were the people of Illinois and upheld the conviction.  Justice 
Stevens cautioned “these cases prove just how unwise today’s judicial 
amendment of the mail fraud statute is.” Id. at 366-68. 
13.  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. at 360. 
3
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 C. The Honest-Services Statute 
 
Congress responded a year later by enacting the honest-
services statute.14  The honest-services statute defines the term 
“scheme or artifice to defraud,” to include “a scheme or artifice 
to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services,” for 
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 
(wire fraud). As interpreted by the Second Circuit: 
 
The definite article ‘the’ suggests that ‘intangible 
right of honest services’ had a specific meaning to 
Congress when it enacted the statute—Congress 
was recriminalizing mail- and wire-fraud 
schemes to deprive others of that ’intangible right 
of honest services,’ which had been protected 
before McNally, not all intangible rights of honest 
services whatever they might be thought to be.15 
 
In Skilling v. United States, the defense urged the Court to 
hold the honest-services statute unconstitutional as 
impermissibly vague.16  Although acknowledging Skilling’s 
vagueness challenge carried some weight, the court declined to 
overturn the statute and opted for a limited construction: 
 
Although some applications of the pre-McNally 
honest-services doctrine occasioned disagreement 
among the Courts of Appeals, these cases do not 
cloud the doctrine’s solid core: The “vast majority” 
of the honest-services cases involved offenders 
who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated 
in bribery or kickback schemes.17 
 
 
14.  18 U.S.C. § 1346.  “There is no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to 
refer to and incorporate the honest-services doctrine recognized in Courts of 
Appeals’ decisions before McNally derailed the intangible-rights theory of 
fraud.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404 (2010).  
15.  Id. at 404-05 (citing United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 137-38 
(2d Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. at 407-08. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/2
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The Court reasoned that “Congress intended § 1346 to reach 
at least bribes and kickbacks,” and “[t]o preserve the statute 
without transgressing constitutional limitations, we now hold 
that § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the 
pre-McNally case law.18 
Notably, the Government had argued that the honest-
services provision encompassed other proscribed conduct, 
specifically “undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or 
private employee -i.e., the taking of official action by the 
employee that furthers his own undisclosed financial interests 
while purporting to act in the interests of those to whom he owes 
a fiduciary duty.”19  
The Court declined to extend its interpretation of the 
honest-services to provision to encompass the “mere failure” to 
disclose conflict-of-interests.  The Court stated that such conduct 
fell outside the “core application” of the honest-services doctrine 
that had developed pre-McNally.  The court continued: 
 
Although the Courts of Appeals upheld honest-
services convictions for “some schemes of non-
disclosure and concealment of material 
information,” . . . they reached no consensus on 
which schemes qualified. In light of the relative 
infrequency of conflict-of-interest prosecutions in 
comparison to bribery and kickback charges, and 
the intercircuit inconsistencies they produced, we 
conclude that a reasonable limiting construction 
of § 1346 must exclude this amorphous category 
of cases.20 
 
The government had claimed that Skilling conspired to 
defraud the shareholders of Enron Corporation by 
misrepresenting the company’s financial growth, which had 
inflated the company’s stock prices.  The Government argued 
that through the fraudulent scheme, Skilling profited 
 
18.  Id. at 408-09 (emphasis added). 
19.  Brief for United States at 43-44, Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 
at 409.   
20.  Skilling, 561 U.S. at 410-11 (internal citations omitted). 
5
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approximately $89 million. 
However, the government did not allege that Skilling had 
either solicited or accepted “side payments from a third party in 
exchange for making these representations.” In the absence of 
such conduct, the Court held “[i]t is therefore clear that, as we 
read § 1346, Skilling did not commit honest-services fraud.”21 
Justice Scalia, concurring with the majority in its opinion 
and judgment, noted the inconsistency between the 
congressional intent behind the honest-services provision and 
the Court’s limited construction: 
 
To say that bribery and kickbacks represented 
“the core” of the doctrine, or that most cases 
applying the doctrine involved those offenses, is 
not to say that they are the doctrine. All it proves 
is that the multifarious versions of the 
doctrine overlap with regard to those offenses. 
But the doctrine itself is much more. Among all 
the pre-McNally smorgasbord offerings of 
varieties of honest-services fraud, not one is 
limited to bribery and kickbacks. That is a dish 
the Court has cooked up all on its own. 
 
Thus, the Court’s claim to “respec[t] the 
legislature,” is false. It is entirely clear (as the 
Court and I agree) that Congress meant to 
reinstate the body of pre-McNally honest-services 
law; and entirely clear that that prohibited much 
more (though precisely what more is uncertain) 
than bribery and kickbacks. Perhaps it is true 
that “Congress intended § 1346 to reach at 
least bribes and kickbacks[.] “That simply does 
not mean, as the Court now holds, that” 
§ 1346 criminalizes only” bribery and kickbacks.22 
 
21.  Id. at 413.  In Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465, 471 (2010), in 
reliance on the Skilling opinion issued the same day, the court vacated a 
conviction because the jury instructions improperly defined what conduct fell 
within the scope of the honest services statute.  
22.  Id. at 421-22 (J., Scalia concurring).  Notably, Scalia later clarified his 
disdain for the Skilling opinion. See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 34 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/2
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II. Continued Implications: Beyond Mail Fraud 
 
The Supreme Court has confirmed the limitation placed on 
the previously coined “honest services” theory, as codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1346.  In Sekar v. United States, the New York State 
Comptroller was responsible for issuing a Commitment 
regarding potential investments of New York’s Common 
Retirement Fund.23 The General Counsel of the Comptroller’s 
office had considered investing in FA Technology Ventures, but 
ultimately wrote a recommendation not to invest in the fund. 
Sekar sent various anonymous emails demanding that the 
general counsel move forward with the investment, and 
threatened to disclose an extra-marital affair if he failed to do 
so.24 Sekar was indicted and convicted of attempted extortion 
under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).25 
The jury was specifically charged, and ultimately based its 
verdict, on finding Sekar had attempted to extort “the General 
Counsel’s recommendation to approve the Commitment.”26 
Under the Hobbs Act, a conviction for extortion required “the 
obtaining of property from another.”27 The Second Circuit held 
that the General Counsel “had a property right in rendering 
sound legal advice to the Comptroller and, specifically, to 
recommend—free from threats—whether the Comptroller 
should issue a Commitment.”28 
The Supreme Court rejected such an interpretation, relying 
on its earlier decision in Scheidler  v. NOW, Inc., which held that 
extortion required depriving “something of value” that the 
person could “exercise, transfer, or sell.”29 The Court continued: 
 
 
 
(2011) (“We have, I recognize, upheld hopelessly vague criminal statutes in the 
past – indeed, in the recent past.  That is regrettable.” (citing Skilling v. United 
States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010)). 
23.  Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 731 (2013). 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. at 730-32. 
26.  Id. at 732. 
27.  Id. at 731 
28.  Id. at 732 (quoting United States v. Sekhar, 683 F.3d 436, 441 (2d 
Cir. 2012)). 
29.  Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 397 (2003). 
7
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The principle announced [in Scheidler]—that a 
defendant must pursue something of value from 
the victim that can be exercised, transferred, or 
sold—applies with equal force here. Whether one 
considers the personal right at issue to be 
“property” in a broad sense or not, it certainly was 
not obtainable property under the Hobbs Act.30 
 
Specifically, the Court noted “[a]dopting the Government’s 
theory here would not only make nonsense of words; it would 
collapse the longstanding distinction between extortion and 
coercion and ignore Congress’s choice to penalize one but not the 
other.”31  Therefore, outside the context of bribery and kickback 
schemes, the Supreme Court has continued to apply a strict 
tangible “property rights” theory. 
However, Justice Scalia’s caution in Skilling v. United 
States concerned more than which specific offenses fell within 
the scope of the honest services provision: 
 
The pre-McNally cases provide no clear indication 
of what constitutes a denial of the right of honest 
services. The possibilities range from any action 
that is contrary to public policy or otherwise 
immoral, to only the disloyalty of a public official 
or employee to his principal, to only the secret use 
of a perpetrator’s position of trust in order to harm 
whomever he is beholden to.32 
 
Even accepting as true that the “core” offenses covered by 
the honest-services provision consisted of only bribery and 
kickbacks, Justice Scalia believed the inherent vagueness of the 
statute would persist: “[E]ven with the bribery and kickback 
limitation the statute does not answer the question, ‘What is the 
criterion of guilt?’”33 
 
 
30.  Sekhar, 570 U.S. at 736-37 (emphasis added). 
31.  Id. at 738. 
32.  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 420 (2010). 
33.  Id. at 421. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/2
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III. The Build-Up to McDonnell 
 
Although the issue arose in the context of the mail fraud 
statute, the inherent vagueness and lack of clear outer-
boundaries would continue to plague the court for years to come 
in the context of public corruption.  Ultimately, the question 
remains unanswered: when does a public official cross the line 
from lawful to culpable conduct? 
The Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in 1991.  In 
McCormick v. United States, McCormick was a member of the 
house of delegates and was working with a lobbyist interested in 
extending a license that allowed foreign medical school 
graduates to practice in the state before passing the state 
licensing exam.34  McCormick had expressed to the lobbyist that 
he paid out-of-pocket for a large part of his campaign, and 
thereafter accepted cash payments of $900 and $2,000 dollars 
from various foreign doctors, which he failed to report as 
campaign contributions or on his federal tax return.  He then 
sponsored a bill to extend the license regarding foreign medical 
school graduates and spoke at length about the bills benefits, 
which was ultimately passed into law.  He was later indicted by 
a federal grand jury for five counts of violating the Hobbs Act, 
including extortion under color of official right. 
18 U.S.C § 1951 (commonly known as the “Hobbs Act”) 
prohibits any person who 
 
in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects 
commerce or the movement of any article of 
commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion 
or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or 
threatens physical violence to any person or 
property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do 
anything in violation of this section.35 
 
Extortion is defined to mean “the obtaining of property from 
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official 
 
34.  McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1991). 
35.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 
9
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right[.]”36 
The jury was instructed on extortion as follows: 
 
Extortion under color of official right means the 
obtaining of money by a public official when the 
money obtained was not lawfully due and owing 
to him or to his office. Of course, extortion does not 
occur where one who is a public official receives a 
legitimate gift or a voluntary political 
contribution even though the political 
contribution may have been made in cash in 
violation of local law. Voluntary is that which is 
freely given without expectation of benefit.37 
 
McCormick was convicted of one, but not all, of the Hobbs 
Act extortion charges.  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that 
proof of a quid pro quo was not required in all circumstances, 
specifically where it is shown that the parties never intended the 
payment as a legitimate campaign contribution in the first 
place.38  Although the Supreme Court limited its holding to 
payments made to elected officials in the context of campaign 
contributions, the Court clarified: 
 
Political contributions are of course vulnerable if 
induced by the use of force, violence, or fear. The 
receipt of such contributions is also vulnerable 
under the Act as having been taken under color of 
official right, but only if the payments are made in 
return for an explicit promise or undertaking by 
the official to perform or not to perform an official 
act. In such situations the official asserts that his 
official conduct will be controlled by the terms of 
the promise or undertaking. This is the receipt of 
money by an elected official under color of official 
right within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.39 
 
36.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). 
37.  McCormick, 500 U.S. at 264-65. 
38.  Id. at 265-66. 
39.  Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/2
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A year later, the Supreme Court addressed the question 
outside the context of campaign contributions in Evans v. United 
States.40  Evans was elected to the Board of Commissioners of a 
county in Georgia.41  After assuming office, he was contacted by 
an FBI agent posing as a real estate developer attempting to re-
zone a tract of land.  After several conversations, all initiated by 
the FBI agent, Evans accepted $7,000 in cash and a $1,000 check 
payable to his campaign.  He did not report the cash on his 
campaign-financing disclosure form or federal income tax 
return.42 Evans was later indicted and convicted of extortion 
under the Hobbs Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 
On appeal, the main issue before the Court was “whether an 
affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as a 
demand, is an element of the offense of extortion ‘under color of 
official right[.]’” 
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the jury was not required 
to find that petitioner had demanded or requested the money, or 
that he had “conditioned the performance of an official act upon 
payment of money.”43  Rather, the Court held: 
 
[P]assive acceptance of a benefit by a public 
official is sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs 
Act violation if the official knows that he is being 
offered the payment in exchange for a specific 
requested exercise of his official power. The 
official need not take any specific action to induce 
the offering of the benefit.44 
 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court endorsed the position of 
the Eleventh Circuit, noting that eight other circuits had 
reached similar holdings.  Two Circuits required “an affirmative 
act or inducement by the public official” to support an extortion 
conviction under the Hobbs Act, which the Supreme Court 
declined to follow.45  The Court reasoned: 
 
40.  Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).  
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 257. 
43.  Id. (citing United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 796 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
44.  Id. at 796. 
45.  Id. (citing United States v. O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1984) 
11
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First, we think the word “induced” is a part of the 
definition of the offense by the private individual, 
but not the offense by the public official. In the 
case of the private individual, the victim’s consent 
must be “induced by wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence or fear.” In the case of 
the public official, however, there is no such 
requirement. The statute merely requires of the 
public official that he obtain “property from 
another, with his consent, . . . under color of 
official right.” The use of the word “or” before” 
under color of official right” supports this reading. 
 
Second, even if the statute were parsed so that the 
word “induced” applied to the public officeholder, 
we do not believe the word “induced” necessarily 
indicates that the transaction must be initiated by 
the recipient of the bribe. Many of the cases 
applying the majority rule have concluded that 
the wrongful acceptance of a bribe establishes all 
the inducement that the statute requires. They 
conclude that the coercive element is provided by 
the public office itself.46 
 
Evans also argued that to support a charge of extortion 
“under color of official right” there must be an “affirmative step” 
on behalf of the public official, and that such requirement must 
be reflected in the jury instructions. The Court rejected his 
argument, holding “the Government need only show that a 
public official has obtained a payment to which he was not 
entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for 
official acts.”47 
 
 
(en banc) (“Although receipt of benefits by a public official is a necessary 
element of the crime, there must also be proof that the public official did 
something, under color of his public office, to cause the giving of 
benefits.”)); United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 1988) (en 
banc) (“We find ourselves in accord with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that 
inducement is an element required for conviction under the Hobbs Act.”)).  
46.  Evans, 504 U.S. at 265-66. 
47.  Id. at 268. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/2
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In 1999, the Court confronted the need to provide a clear 
definition of “official act” in the context of the federal bribery and 
illegal gratuities provisions: 
 
Bribery requires intent “to influence” an official 
act or “to be influenced” in an official act, while 
illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be 
given or accepted “for or because of” an official act. 
In other words, for bribery there must be a quid 
pro quo-a specific intent to give or receive 
something of value in exchange for an official act. 
An illegal gratuity, on the other hand, may 
constitute merely a reward for some future act 
that the public official will take (and may already 
have determined to take), or for a past act that he 
has already taken.48 
 
The District Court’s instructions in this case, in 
differentiating between a bribe and an illegal gratuity, correctly 
noted that only a bribe requires proof of a quid pro quo. The 
point in controversy here is that the instructions went on to 
suggest that § 201(c)(1)(A), unlike the bribery statute, did not 
require any connection between respondent’s intent and a 
specific official act.49  Rather, the court held the Government is 
required to prove “a link between a thing of value conferred upon 
a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which 
it was given.”50 
 
IV. The McDonnell Decision 
 
Former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell was charged and 
convicted of eleven counts of bribery-related charges after 
receiving over $175,000 in gifts and loans from Jonnie Williams, 
Sr., in exchange for the former governor’s assistance in making 
profitable a dietary supplement sold by Mr. Williams.51  The 
 
48.  United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999). 
49.  Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added). 
50.  Id. at 414. 
51.  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016); see also Tara 
13
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charges included conspiracy to attempt honest-services wire 
fraud, committing honest-services wire fraud, and extortion 
under the Hobbs Act by obtaining property under color of official 
right under U.S.C. § 1951. The underlying theory of the charges 
was that McDonnell accepted bribes from Williams.52 
The parties had conceded that knowledge that the “thing of 
value” was obtained “in return for official action” was a 
requirement of the Hobbs Act extortion charge.  Therefore, “the 
Government was required to prove that Governor McDonnell 
committed or agreed to commit an ‘official act’ in exchange for 
the loans and gifts from Williams.”53  The Government alleged 
that the following qualified as official acts: 
 
(1) arranging meetings for [Williams] with 
Virginia government officials, who were 
subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and 
promote Anatabloc; 
 
(2) hosting, and . . . attending, events at the 
Governor’s Mansion designed to encourage 
Virginia university researchers to initiate studies 
of anatabine and to promote Star Scientific’s 
products to doctors for referral to their patients; 
 
(3) contacting other government officials in the 
[Governor’s Office] as part of an effort to 
encourage Virginia state research universities to 
initiate studies of anatabine; 
 
(4) promoting Star Scientific’s products and 
facilitating its relationships with Virginia 
government officials by allowing [Williams] to 
invite individuals important to Star Scientific’s 
business to exclusive events at the Governor’s 
 
Malloy, Symposium: Is it bribery or “the basic compact underlying 
representative government?”, (July 28, 2016 4:03 PM) SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-is-it-bribery-or-the-basic-
compact-underlying-representative-government/. 
52.  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366. 
53.  Id. at 2365. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/2
(688-706) PRIMER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/18  8:50 PM 
702 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38:3 
Mansion; and 
 
(5) recommending that senior government 
officials in the [Governor’s Office] meet with Star 
Scientific executives to discuss ways that the 
company’s products could lower healthcare 
costs.54 
 
A unanimous Supreme Court overturned McDonnell’s 
conviction holding the district court erred by improperly 
instructing the jury on the definition of “official act” to 
encompass setting up meetings or other related conduct, without 
more. 
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) defines “official act” as “any decision or 
action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may 
by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s 
official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”55  
The Court chose to adopt a “bounded interpretation” of “official 
act.”  The Court explained there are two requirements for 
conduct to fall within the scope of an “official act,” pursuant 
§ 201(a)(3): 
 
First, the Government must identify a “question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” 
that “may at any time be pending” or “may by law 
be brought” before a public official. Second, the 
Government must prove that the public official 
made a decision or took an action “on” that 
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or 
controversy, or agreed to do so.56  
 
The Court explained the terminology “may by law” connotes 
“something within the specific duties of an official’s position — 
the function conferred by the authority of his office.”57  
 
54.  Id. at 2365-66. 
55.  18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). 
56.  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct.  at 2358. 
57.  Id. at 2369. 
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Additionally, the Court clarified that, “[t]he word ‘any’ conveys 
that the matter may be pending either before the public official 
who is performing the official act, or before another public 
official.”58 
Furthermore, the Court expressly rejected that “[s]etting up 
a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event (or 
agreeing to do so)” would not fall within the scope of an official 
act, without more.59 Rather, “something more is 
required: §201(a)(3) specifies that the public official must make 
a decision or take an action on that question or matter, or agree 
to do so.”60  The court listed several examples: 
 
[A] decision or action to initiate a research study 
— or a decision or action on a qualifying step, such 
as narrowing down the list of potential research 
topics — would qualify as an “official act.” A public 
official may also make a decision or take an action 
on a “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy” by using his official position to exert 
pressure on another official to perform an “official 
act.” In addition, if a public official uses his official 
position to provide advice to another official, 
knowing or intending that such advice will form 
the basis for an “official act” by another official, 
that too can qualify as a decision or action for 
purposes of §201(a)(3).61  
 
The Court did add that ultimately acting upon a promise to 
act is not necessary, nor does a public official need to explain the 
means of accomplishing how he will fulfill said promise as part 
of the bargain.  The court explained that a limiting 
interpretation was necessary, otherwise any decision or action 
by a public official could potentially fall within the scope of the 
statutory prohibition. 
 
 
58.  Id. at 2358. 
59.  Id. at 2372. 
60.  Id. at 2370. 
61.  Id. 
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V. Post-McDonnell: Lasting Implications 
 
Since McDonnell, even though the statute has not changed, 
the standard has.  McDonnell has broadened what falls within 
the scope of “routine political favors” and clarified that such 
conduct will not, in and of itself, constitute public corruption. 
In response to the McDonnell scandal, the Virginia 
legislature passed a law limiting the value of gifts that the 
Governor and members of the Virginia General Assembly may 
receive to $100.62  Therefore, although the former-governor’s 
conduct would not constitute an “official act” under federal law, 
Virginia state law would prohibit similar conduct moving 
forward. 
One scholar has noted that courts may apply the narrow 
definition to all of the public corruption statutes.  Will courts 
apply the narrow definition to all similarly-phrased statutory 
provisions, or only to those similar to McDonnell?63  In the 
Second Circuit, convictions have been vacated because the jury 
instructions did not comply with the Supreme Court’s narrow 
interpretation of official act.64 
 
 
62.  Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3103.1 (West 2015). Campaign contributions are 
excluded from the coverage of the statute. Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3101. 
63.  Adam F. Minchew, Note, Who Put The Quo In Quid Pro Quo?: Why 
Courts Should Apply McDonnell’s “Official Act” Definition Narrowly, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1793 (2017). 
64.  See generally United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Skelos, 
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18525 (2d Cir. 2017). See also Eugene Temchenko, Note, 
A First Amendment Right To Corrupt Your Politician, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 
465, 490-91, 495 (2018) (“McDonnell changed things. On July 13, 2017, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the conviction of New York 
State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, citing McDonnell v. United States. 
The prosecution charged Silver with many corrupt schemes. For example, 
Silver allegedly funneled $500,000 in taxpayer-funded research grants to a 
doctor in exchange for the doctor steering his patients to Silver’s law firm. 
Silver also met with lobbyists, hosted parties and voted for legislation that 
benefited real estate developers, allegedly in exchange for the developers’ use 
of a law firm that paid Silver referral fees. Despite finding ample evidence, the 
Court of Appeals reversed Silver’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, 
holding that the jury instruction ‘captured lawful conduct, such as arranging 
meetings or hosting events with constituents.’ The jury instructions were 
overbroad because, post McDonnell, the instructions captured examples of 
lawful influence peddling.”). 
17
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VI. Opinions & Views 
 
• Jessica Tillipman, an Assistant Dean at George Washington 
University Law School, stated: “It just raises the standard 
of prosecution to a very, very high level.  I think it’s going 
to make it a lot easier for politicians to accept gifts and 
hospitality and payments in return for taking action.”65 
• Stephen Farnsworth, a political scientist at the University 
of Mary Washington in Virginia, stated: “The Supreme 
Court decision really gives a green light to elected officials 
to solicit whatever goodies they may wish, as long as 
they’re not clear about doing anything in return.”66 
• Randall Eliason, a former federal prosecutor commented: 
“The Supreme Court has actually opened the door for 
public officials to charge businesspeople and the like for 
access to political-natured meetings. He outlined a 
scenario, which he said would now be legal, in which a 
governor could accept money in exchange for arranging a 
business owner to meet with public officials, specifically 
stipulating that they won’t influence the outcome.”67 
 
The first policy reason Chief Justice Roberts 
offered in support of the McDonnell decision is 
that broad application of bribery statutes could 
deter officials from “respond[ing] to even the most 
commonplace requests for assistance,” and 
citizens “from participating in democratic 
discourse.” This formulation raises the question of 
why broad application of a bribery statute, or any 
other anti-corruption statute, would deter citizens 
from democratic discourse. That is, if the citizen 
were merely speaking, there would be no grounds 
 
65.   Matt Zapotosky, In McDonnell case, Supreme Court makes it harder 
to prosecute corruption, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 27, 2016) https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-mcdonnell-case-supreme 
-court-makes-it-harder-to-prosecute-corruption/2016/06/27/dedf4baa-3c81-11e 
6-a66f-aa6c1883b6b1_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.782691d5b391. 
66.  Alan Greenblatt, In Wake of McDonnell Ruling, What Counts as 
Corruption?, GOVERNING (June 29, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/ 
politics/gov-scotus-mcdonnell-virginia-corruption.html. 
67.  Id. 
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for finding corruption—no quid.  Chief Justice 
Roberts’s formulation only makes sense if the 
citizen engages in democratic discourse with 
money or other consideration, as in Citizens 
United.  Similarly, anti-corruption statutes would 
rarely apply to an official’s response to a 
constituent’s request for assistance.  For example, 
no one would suspect corruption if a senator were 
to advocate a bill to assist victims of a natural 
disaster.  Common sense dictates that official acts 
that benefit the public in general would make for 
poor prosecutions.  Anticorruption statutes are 
only relevant, therefore, when a public official 
shows undue favor to an individual or a select 
group of individuals in exchange for some benefit.  
Thus explained, the Chief Justice appears 
concerned that broad bribery statutes would deter 
citizens from contributing funds in exchange for 
special treatment.  In fact, the Chief Justice labels 
such exchanges as “participat[ion] in democratic 
discourse” rather than corruption.  Accordingly, 
Chief Justice Roberts’s public policy concern is 
congruent with Citizens United’s First 
Amendment concern.  As in Citizens United, the 
McDonnell Court asserts that “[i]ngratiation and 
access . . . are not corruption.”68 
 
68.  Temchenko, supra note 64, at 490-91 (internal citations omitted).  
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